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Article 2

Parol Evidence Rule
By JosEPH UnQuico

The term "parol" is of French origin. Its literal meaning is word, or speech. In this sense it is synonymous with
the term "oral." In practice, however, it also has a conventional meaning. As applied to contracts it means not under
seal. In other words a parol contract is a simple contract,
as distinguished from a contract under seal. It may be in
writing, or merely oral. If a contract under seal be subsequently modified by oral agreement of the parties it will
become thereby wholly parol. This has been decided in
Mifunroe v. Perkins, 26 Mass. 298.
The term "parol" as used in the law of pleadings, has
also a conventional meaning. The pleadings themselves are
called the parol; and in some cases the term is used to denote the entire pleading in the cause.
In the law of evidence, the term is also used in conventional sense. As used in the phrase "Parol Evidence Rule"
it is synonymous with term "verbal" as. distinguished from
the term "oral." These two terms, however, are often incorrectly used and interchangeably.
The Parol Evidence Rule, is one of the most ancient
rules of evidence of wide application which rests upon the
principle that no testimony can be received to contradict,
vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a valid written
instrument. The two chief reasons for the rule are: (1) The
uncertainty of memory, and (2) The danger of falsehood.
The rule is also founded on the long experience, that written
evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that
which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be un.safe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and
vary the stronger, and to show that the parties intended a
different contract from that expressed in the writing signed
by them. Justice Sewall says, "The preference which the
law gives to written evidence, when compared with parol
testimony, of parol agreements, is the unavoidable result
of experience. It is impossible to attain that certainty and
exactness in the one form of evidence, which is found in
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the other. When a contract has been stated in a writing
assented to and signed by the parties concerned, and that
continues in being, and under the control of the parties Jtelying upon it, evidence of the other parol agreements, to explain or vary the written agreement, would be a rejection
,of that evidence which isnecessarily the best. Justice Dean
says, "If it were not for the rule, no man would be able to
protect himself by the most solemn forms and attestation
against falsehood, misrepresentation and perjury." Air.
Stephen states the rule more fully in this way: "When any
judgment of any court, or any other judicial or official proceeding, or any other disposition of property had been reduced to the form of a document or series of documents, no
evidence may be given of such judgment or proceeding,
except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in case in which secondary evidence is allowed. In
Van Sickel v. Dalrympel, it was held that when the parties
to a contract had deliverately put their engagement into
writing, in such terms as to import legal obligation without
any uncertainty as to the object or intent of their engagement, it is conclusively presumed that every part of their
contract it was reduced to writing, and oral evidence therefore of what was said during the negotiations of the contract, or at the time of the execution must be excluded on
the ground that the parties have made the writing the only
repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not
found in the writing is waived and abandoned.
In Weston v. Ames, (Thayer 115) it was decided, that
a written contract can not be altered by parol evidence to
show that a particular ship different from that described
in the policy of insurance, was verbally accepted at the time
of the contract.
There are, however, numerous exceptions and qualifications which limits the application of the parol evidence
rule. If the rule were strictly applied to those writings,
which are incomplete, informal or transitory in their character, it might be deemed unreasonably rigid and harsh, but
there can be no such criticism of the rule when applied to
those more solemn documents in which the parties have
made a complete and distinct memorial of their agreement.

TiE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

One of the cases which we may regard as a qualification
of the general rule, is the case when an oral evidence is introduced on the ground that duress or fraud has been perpetrated in the execution of the contract. Such proof does
not recognize the contract as ever existing as a valid agreement, and is received from the necessity of the case, to
show that, that which appears to be a contract is not and
never was a contract. In Day v. Lown, it was decided, that
parol evidence may be introduced to prove that a conveyance or other contract has been obtained by fraud, or that
the wrong bounderies have been pointed out in the sale of
land. For the purpose of proving the fraud, verbal state-'
ments which are material and fraudulent, although made
before or at the same time with the written agreement, may
be proved. In such case the rule that prior negotiations are
merged in the written agreement does not apply; this has
been decided in Johnson v. Cummings (55 P. 269).
Since it may always be shown that the document in
question never had a legal existence, it follows that it may
be shown to be tainted with illegality. In such case the
court will go behind the apparently valid and written instrument, and deal with transaction on its merits; and it is
immaterial whether the illegality of the transaction is created by the statute, or whether it is irmnoral, or in some
other way contiavenes the general policy of the law. In
Sherman v. Whilder, (106 Mass. 537) has been decided,
that a contract which was made for the furtherance of an
adultereous intercourse, was null and void as against public
policy. On the same general principle it may be said that
evidence may be introduced to show by parol evidence that
the apparent written contract has no legal existence by reason of the incapacity of the party to make a contract. In
Barret v. Buxton (2 Atl. 267) it was decided that a contract was null and void because one of the parties was intoxicated. In Van Valkenburg v. Rourk (12 Atl. 357) it
has been decided that the infancy is a legal impediment
which prevented the making of a binding contract.
One of the well recognized exceptions to the general
rule, against varying the terms of a written instrument is
that the rule does not apply in all cases'to exclude evidence
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of mistake of fact. The right to vary an instrument by
proof of mistake is based solely on the ground that it would
operate as a fraud upon the party in the given case, if the
alleged mistake could not be corrected. In Razor v. Razor
(142 Il. 375). It 3yas decided that parol evidence is admissible to show the intention of the parties with the view
of correcting the mistake. We must therefore treat the cases
in which equity affords relief, and allows parol evidence to
vary and reform written contracts and instruments upon
the ground of accident and mistake, as properly forming
like cases of fraud, exceptions to the general rule, which
excludes parol evidence, and as standing in the same policy
as the rule itself. In Emery v. Molher (62 Il. 69). It has
been held that "Strangers to a written instrument, when
their rights are concerned, are at liberty to show by parol
evidence, that the contract of the parties is different from
what it purports to be on the face of the writing. And the
rule that parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms
of a written contract is not applicable to a suit between one
of the parties to it and a third person."
Dates of written instrument are, like the consideration,
prima facies correct. But the data is treated as one of the
mere formal parts of the instrument; and parol evidence
is often admitted to show that, through mistake or some
other reason, the date named is incorrect. The rule that
dates are presumed to be correct does not apply whqre there
is reason to suspect that the date is false because of collusion.
The most common illustration of this is in cases where
adultery is the issue, and the dates of letters between the
parties become material. In such cases no presumption of
correctness should be relied upon, but the dates should be
proved to be correct. In Sweetser v. Lowell (33 Mass. 446).
It has been held that, it may be shown that a note offered in
evidence is the one secured by a mortgage, though it vary
in date from the description of it given in the mortgage.
In Vaughan v. Parker, (16 S. E. 908) it was allowed to
prove by parol evidence that a writ bearing date on Sunday
was in fact made on a different day.
Where a writing although embodying an agreement,
is manifestly incomplete, and is not intended by the parties
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to exhibit the whole, agreement but only to define some of
its terms, the writing is cofclusive as far as it goes. But
such parts of the actual contract, as are not embraced within
its scope, may be established by parol. Thus has been decided in Joannes v. Mudge, (6 Allen, 345). That when an
agreement is made between parties and for some reason or
another the place of carrying out of the contract is not
specified, it is clearly manifested the incompleteness of the
contract and in this case, parol evidence is allowed to prove
-as to what place they agreed to have the contract, carried
out. Incomplete documents are not within the scope of the
parol evidence rule. A contract which is partly in writing
and partly oral is regarded as a parol contract; and extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove the oral part, provided such evidence is not repugnant to the written part.
Parol evidence is admissible in the construction of contracts, to define the nature and qualities of the subject matter, the situation and relation of the parties, and all the circumstances, in order that the court may put themselves in
the place of the parties, see how the terms of the instrument
affect the subject matter, and ascertain the significationwhich ought to be given to any phrase or term in the contract which is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one
interpretation; and this although the result of the evidence
may be to contradict the usual meaning of terms and phrases
used in the contract; but if the words are clear and unambiguous a contrary intention may not be derived from the
circumstances. Thus, in the following bequests, "I give
and bequest to my son William the sum of i.x.x. To my
son Robert Charles the sum of o.x.x.," etc., parol evidence
is admissible to show the meaning of the letters i.x.x. and
o.x.x. Kell v. Charmer 23 N. E. 869.
It sometimes happens that the subject-matter of a document, after being correctly and completely described, is
given a super-added and incorrect description. In such cases
the latter description may be rejected as surplusage. As
said by Chief Justice Caton, "If I give a bill of sale of my
black horses, and describe them as being now in my barn,
I shall not avoid it by showing that horses were in the pasture or on the road. The description of the horses being
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sufficient to enable witnesses acquainted with my stock to
identify them, the locality specified would be' rejected as
surplusage. Nor is this rule confiaied to personal property.
It is equally applicable to real estate. If I sell an estate, and
describe it.as my dwelling house in which I now reside, situated in the city of Ottawa, I shall not avoid the- deed by
showing that my residence was outside the city limits.
Parol evidence is admissible to rebut a disputable presumption of law raised by principles of equity against the
apparent intention of the parties as expressed in a document.
Thus has been decided in Hurst v. Beach 5 Madd. 351
(1829). That where two legacies, of like terms and motives,
are bequeathed to the same party by the same testator,. in
different instruments, a disputable presumption of law is
raised that the legacies are not cumulative; and .parol evidence is admissible to rebut this presumption. The effect of
the parol evidence in such a case is not to showthat the testator did not mean what the will states, but rather to show',
that he did mean what it states.
Parol evidence is admissible to prove a prior parol
agreement, where the purpose of introducing the parol
agreement is to show that the written contract was not to
be binding until the performance of some condition prece-,
dent resting in parol, and where the purpose of the action
is to recover damages for breach of the parol agreement,
and not to defeat an action on the written contract. Thus
it has been decided in Morgan v. Griffith, Thayer 842. That
the verbal agreement was entirely collateral to the lease and
was founded on good consideration, namely the promise of
defendant to destroy the rabbits, without the performance
of which, the plaintiff would have not signed the lease.
Parol evidence may be introduced to prove collateral
and contemporaneous parol agreement- when the subjectmatter of the collateral parol agreement-is independent and
distinct from that to. which the written contract relates. In
We 8 v. Rhodius (87 Ind. 1) it was decided that, a parol
agreement collateral to and distinct from a written contract
between the same parties made in consideration of the execution of the writing may be valid and that, the lessor in'
writing lease of a hotel 'may bind himself by a contempo-
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raneous parol agreement made in consideration of the execution of the lease, not to engage in a rival business in the
same city. In an action for damages for the breach of such
agreement, parol evidence is competent.
In Reynold v. Robinson, an action was brought for the
breach of a written contract for the sale of certain lumbers
on credit. On the trial the court allowed def. to prove by
parol evidence that the contract was to become binding at
the report of defendant's agencies as to the pecuniary condition of the plaintiff. That it brings the case within the
rule that parol evidence is admissible to show that a written
paper which appears to be a complete instrument, is in fact
subject to a certain precedent condition resting in parol.
Parol evidence is not admissible to explain phrases,
words and abbreviations which have a common meaning and
which are intelligible in the connections in which they are
used. Such evidence, however, is admissible to explain expressions which have an ambiguous meaning, or which are
'rendered unintelligible or ambiguous owing to the connection in which they are used. Thus, parol evidence has been
held admissible to explain such expressions as "barrels,"
"current funds," "thousand," "horse chains," "hrd pan,"
and the like. In Myers v. Sarl et ul., Thayer 938, it was
decided that although no parol evidence is admissible to contradict, vary, add to or subtract. from a writing contract
when the words or terms used bear not only ordinary meaning, but also one peculiar to the department of trade or business to which the contract relates, it is obvious that due effect
would not be given to the intention, if the terms were interpreted according to their ordinary meaning and not to their
peculiar signification.
Parol evidence is admissible to establish a resulting
trust. A resulting trust is not created by the agreement of
the parties, but by implication of law apart from the agreement. It springs from the acts of the parties and from their
contract. As said by Justice Magruder, "When the two
facts to-wit; payment of the purchase money by one, and
conveyance of the. title thereby purchased to another, are
found to exist, then the law so construes those facts as to
make them constitute a resulting trust, and, for this reason,
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such a trust is said to arise by operation of law. Since the.
whole foundation of resulting trust of this class is the ownership and payment of the purchased money by one when the
title is taken in the name of another, it follows that such
trust may be established by parol evidence. Van Buskirk
v. Van Buskirk, 148 Ill. 8.
There are two kinds of ambiguities of words; the one is
ambiguitas patens and the other latens. Patens is that which
appears to be ambiguous upon the deed or instrument; latens
is that which seems certain and without ambiguity, for anything that appears upon the deed or instrument; but there
is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth the
ambiguity. Ambiguitas patens is never holpen by averment; and the reason is because the law will not couple
and mingle matter of specialty, which is of the higher account, with matters of averment, which is of inferior account in law. Based upon this view, it has very frequently
been said that parol evidence is admissible to explain a latent
ambiguity, but not to explain a patent one. This statement,
however, is altogether too broad, and quite misleading.
Parol evidence is admissible to explain a patent ambiguity,
except in the one case of declaration of intention. In Reed
v. Insurance Co., Thayer 934. A bill has been filed upon
an insurance policy of ship owned by defendant and wrecked
at Baker's Island. The question was about the meaning
of the words, inserted on the insurance: "The owner suspends the risk while at Baker's Island loading" whether it
meant for the purpose of loading or actually loading. In the
first case the Co. is held liable, while in the latter it is not.
It has been held, that writing may be read by the light of
surrounding circumstances in order to understand perfectly
the intent and meaning of the parties; but as they have constituted the writing to be the only outward and visible expression of their meaning no other words are to be added or
substituted instead. The duty of the court is to ascertain,
not what the parties may have secretly intended, as contradistinguished from their words expressed, but what is the
meaning of the words they used. Upon this principle, the
meaning of the words which are presented for our consideration, is that the risk is to be suspended while at Baker's
Island whether actually loading or not.
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In Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Society, Thayer 9S9, a bill
of interpleader was filed against the def. by an executor of
will, leaving certain legacies to Seaman's Aid Aid Society.
It disclosed later there was three Societies. One Seaman's
Friend Society in N. Y. and another ... Seaman's Friend
Society and the Seaman's Aid Society composed by females.
Evidence was introduced to show that the testator meant
to leave to Seaman's Friend Society and not to defendant.
It .was held, that this case is not of latent ambiguity. On
the face of the will all is plain and clear. The description in
the will in this case is sufficiently described as to give a room
of doubt.
In Stringer v. Gardner,Thayer 976, a suit was brought
about a will. The will stated the following gift: I give and
bequeath to my niece Elizabeth Stringer the sum of $20,000
and all my premises in trust for my said niece. The def.
contended that the persons named in the will was the plaintiff, a grandmother, who has been in intimate terms with
the testator. The said person died four years ago. It was
held that this is a patent ambiguity and therefore parol evidence cannot be introduced. Plaintiff's right to the will in
this case is very well established. At the time of the making
of the will there was no other person-who answered the description of niece at all. The grandmother was at that time
in her grave, of which fact the testator was aware.
In Hiscock v. Hiscock, Thayer 125, the question was
about the meaning of the word elder son. The testator has
been married twice, and got two eldest sons, and the question is to whom the will is referred to. It was held that in
this case parol evidence cannot be introduced as -he introduction of any evidence would not help in any to clear up
the ambiguity of the word.
The exceptions to the general rule as to explain written
instruments it applies also to a negotiable paper. It is always allowed to prove the failure of consideration, illegality
of the consideration for which the note was given, the material alteration on the instrument, and all other circumstances which might vitiate the execution of an ordinary
contract. As between the original parties, the conditional
delivery of the instrument may be shown, as that it was de-
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livered in escrow. This has been decided in Couch v. Meeker,
2 Conn. 302. Also in Thomson v. Thomas, 13 Kan. 217.
Where an instrument in writing partakes both of the qualities of a contract and of a receipt, it is opened to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence as to those particulars which constitute a receipt, but that parol evidence is
inadmissible to contradict those particulars which import a
.contract. One of the most common examples* of this principle is the bill of lading. From the nature of such instruments, they must contain recitals as to the receipt of goods,
such as those of the time, quantity, quality and condition
of the goods, as well as certain other statements which are
rather in the nature of agreements than recitals. While the
recitals of the character named are generally opened to
explanation and contradiction, yet the agreements and promises are not. This has been decided in Cincinnati Ry. Co.
v. Pontius, 19 Ohio 221. In National Bank v. Chicago Ry.
Co., 46 N. W. 432. It has been decided that the carrier
may show, in an action between himself and the one claiming to have shipped the goods, that no goods were received.
In Polard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7, has been decided, that a
carrier may show in an action between himself and the one
claiming to have shipped the goods that no goods were received, even against a bona fide holder of the bill of lading,
as it is held that a common carrier is not stopped to deny
such statement could have no authority to make. That a common carrier may contradict statements in bill of lading as to
the condition in which the goods are received, as that owing
to some laten defect, they were not in good order, although
the bill of lading so imported, it was decided in Barret v.
Rogers, 7 Mass. 297. Also in Ill. Central Ry. Co. v. Cobb,
72, Ill. 479.
Although there has been a considerable discussion of
the question and some conflict of opinion, the weight of
authority seems to be that subsequent declarations of a testator are admissible to prove the contents and existence of
a lost will, as well as the facts that it had not been cancelled.
Harringv. Allen, 25 Mich. 505. In Steinke's Will, 70 N.W.
61, was held that when a will can not be found, subsequent
declarations, of the testator may be admitted to rebut the
presumption of revocation.
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The relaxation of the general rule in 'such manner as
to allow parol evidence of customs and usage for the purpose of annexing incidents to or explaining the meaning of
certain contracts has for a long time been of frequent occurrence in Tespect to contract dealings between landlord
and tenant. In a well known case Baron Parke explained
that the courts had looked with favor upon evidence of
usage and customs in this class of cases for the reason that
the common law had done little to prescribe the relative
duties of landlord and tenant; and that justice required
proof of those usages which had grown up and become beneficial to the parties. Hutton v. Warren, 3 L. R. A. 331.
There are certain essentials which should be shown
before any proof of usage can be given to affect a contract,
either written or oral. The usage must be reasonable. The
view has been suggested that usages of trade that are unreasonable will not gain a permanent foothold, and that
if a usage had grown up this is of itself well nigh conclusive evidence that the usage is not unreasonable. 2. The
usage must be an established one. 3. The usage must .be
known. 4. The usage must be consistent with the contract.
5. The usage must be general.

